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Introduction 
Intelligence can be a powerful tool for public diplomacy. It adds an element of objectivity to a 
government’s public appeals, legitimizing its decisions by evidence rather than by ideology or 
instinct. Loch Johnson proposes that intelligence can become “politicized” in this process, but 
that in democratic regimes it will be most often countered by the influence of professional 
integrity.1 Standing against this proposition is the United States’ and the United Kingdom’s 
misuse of intelligence to justify the 2003 American-led invasion of Iraq. This example has been 
used more than any other to highlight the problematic relationship between intelligence and 
public diplomacy. 
 
This article argues that the way the executive branch uses intelligence for public diplomacy will 
need to change if it is to remain effective. Rather than simply presenting the executive branch’s 
own interpretation of intelligence assessments, governments will need to share more of the 
unaltered assessments written by the intelligence communities themselves. The use of the term 
"intelligence" refers to the assessments produced by intelligence organizations to inform 
executive branch decision-making. When these assessments regarding national security issues 
have been used by the executive branch to support diplomatic aims and domestic political 
purposes, they have been assumed to have a degree of legitimacy, authority and seriousness that 
would not be implied of documents released by non-intelligence organizations.  
 
This perceived legitimacy has been damaged by both the Bush and Blair administration’s public 
presentation of intelligence to support the invasion of Iraq in 2003. It demonstrated to British and 
American citizens that when the executive branch presents its own version of intelligence 
assessments it can lead to incomplete and/or misleading messages. Since then, the United States’ 
and United Kingdom’s presentation of intelligence advocating an attack on Syria has suggested 
that these governments may be changing the way that they present intelligence. This will be 
increasingly necessary in order to change the views of domestic audiences now skeptical of 
intelligence justifications for major foreign policy decisions. 
 
This article proceeds in five sections. The first section reviews the concept of public diplomacy 
as it applies to intelligence and the problem of the “politicization of intelligence.” Next, the 
article briefly examines the current literature that has criticized the use of intelligence for public 
diplomacy. The third section explores the pretext for the Iraq War as a case study, examining 
how American and British intelligence were referenced in public to make the case against 
Saddam Hussein and how this process led to problems. Drawing principally from the British 
public inquiry into the Iraq War (“the Iraq Inquiry”), the article also examines what lessons the 
British government learned from that experience. The fourth section compares the use of 
intelligence leading up to the Iraq War to the recent employment of intelligence assessments 
advocating for military action against the Syrian regime for the 2013 sarin gas attack (a proposal 
which was ultimately abandoned). The final section argues that social and technological changes 
will accelerate pressure on governments to present intelligence in a more transparent manner in 
the future. 
 
                                                          
1
 Loch Johnson, “Sketches for a Theory of Strategic Intelligence,” in Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, and Mark Phythian 
(eds.), Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates (London: Routledge, 2009): 46. 
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Three limitations should be acknowledged at the outset. First, the case studies assume clear 
communication between the executive branches of government and their audiences. In many 
cases, however, the “real” audience is the media, who reinterpret government messages for their 
own audiences. Rather than exploring this second stage of communication, this article focuses on 
the reaction of the media to government messages. Second, the article acknowledges that every 
recipient of government information has his/her own biases and assumptions. For simplicity, this 
article treats them equally and relies on public polls to measure the success of the government’s 
advocacy. Differences between members of the public in their reception of government messages 
would serve as an interesting follow-up study. Lastly, it should not be assumed that the 
conclusions from this study would be equally applicable to countries other than the United States 
and the United Kingdom. Audiences in other countries may have different standards of 
transparency and perceive government messages in a different way. 
 
Intelligence in Public Diplomacy versus the “Politicization of Intelligence” 
Before examining the role of intelligence in public diplomacy, it is important to understand how 
intelligence is used for public diplomacy and how it can become politicized. While some 
definitions of public diplomacy focus on foreign audiences, this article focuses exclusively on 
domestic ones.2 In this context, intelligence is used for public diplomacy when it is publicly 
presented to support a policy decision. Public diplomacy is combined with intelligence when the 
government seeks to harness the political power of an intelligence assessment to justify some 
policy or action to the public. Thus, the use of intelligence in public diplomacy can be 
conceptualized as falling after the “dissemination” stage of the intelligence cycle.3 The central 
objective of this strategy is to change public opinion.4  
 
Glenn Hastedt has labeled the manipulation of intelligence by the executive branch for policy 
objectives as “the politicization of intelligence.”5 Of course, he acknowledges that it would be 
wrong to imply that any political use of intelligence is bad. When the executive branch relies on 
unaltered intelligence assessments to support a particular point of view, it does not subvert the 
purpose of intelligence, it fulfills it. This treatment of intelligence could be classified as a 
responsible use of intelligence for public diplomacy. However, when the executive branch alters 
the assumptions behind an intelligence assessment, or worse, uses its power to remove 
unfavourable information, its actions enter the realm of “the politicization of intelligence.”6  
 
Although intelligence is used for public diplomacy in many contexts, this article focuses on 
justifications of military action. When justifying a prospective or ongoing military action, these 
decisions have been the main source of controversy for intelligence in public diplomacy in recent 
                                                          
2
 Philip Seib, “Public Diplomacy and Journalism: Parallels, Ethical Issues and Practical Concerns,” American 
Behavioural Scientist 52:1 (2009): 773. 
3
 “Security Intelligence Cycle,” Canadian Security Intelligence Service, August 29, 2013, available at: 
https://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/bts/ccl-eng.asp. 
4
 Abiodun Williams, “Public Diplomacy in an Age of Faith,” in Philip Seib (ed), Toward a New Public Diplomacy 
(New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan: 2009), 233. 
5
 Glenn Hastedt, “The Politics of Intelligence and the Politicization of Intelligence: the American Experience,” 
Intelligence and National Security 5 (2013): 6. 
6
 Ibid: 10. 
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years. Public diplomacy in this context has been labeled the “presentational aspects” of war.7 
Aside from the recognition that intelligence plays a role in public diplomacy, it has been 
observed that the relationship between intelligence and public diplomacy is seldom discussed in 
intelligence studies.8 Robert Mandel’s article is an exception, which warned that America’s use 
of intelligence for public diplomacy is “spinning out of public control.”9  
 
The Dangers of Intelligence in Public Diplomacy 
Intelligence can be an effective tool to inform the public of the pros and cons of a particular 
course of action, but it comes with risks. The main risk of using intelligence for public 
diplomacy is that even when intelligence does not directly contradict what policymakers want it 
to reveal, it will likely introduce nuances that create political difficulties.10 These nuances can 
tempt policymakers to distort information when they present it to the public. As Mandel 
explains, policymakers often seek “dire numbers” to justify their policy changes, which can force 
analysts to deliberately distort their analysis.11 Even if distortions are not made at the analysis 
stage, these numbers can still be altered before they are presented to the public. 
 
When policymakers misrepresent intelligence it can lead to dangerous situations. Perhaps the 
most extreme example is President Johnson’s instructions to the Director of Central Intelligence, 
Richard Helms, to write a paper containing the points that he wanted emphasized about the 
Vietnam War.12 Even when it is not deliberate, the public presentation of intelligence can lead to 
the omission of important caveats and qualifications.13 It is perhaps for this reason that “there is a 
natural uneasiness on the part of anyone who has worked in the intelligence business at putting 
anything into the public domain.”14 Despite this discomfort, Professor Bruce Gregory pointed out 
that even by 2005 there had been no calls for public diplomacy reform in the same way that there 
have been calls for intelligence reform.15  
 
One could counter here that there are many legitimate reasons to employ intelligence for public 
diplomacy as well. After all, the modern conception of the “intelligence cycle” acknowledges 
that intelligence priorities should be set by the executive branch based on policy concerns.16 
                                                          
7
 “Sir Gus O’Donnell transcript,” The Iraq Inquiry, January 28, 2011, available at: 
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/51849/20110202-odonnell-final.pdf.  
8
 James J Wirtz, “The Sources and Methods of Intelligence Studies,” in Loch K. Johnson (ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook of National Security Intelligence (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010), 23; Hastedt, “The 
Politics of Intelligence and the Politicization of Intelligence,” 6. 
9
 Robert Mandel, “On Estimating Post-Cold War Enemy Intention,” Intelligence and National Security 24:2 (2009): 
207. 
10
 Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 162. 
11
 Robert Mandel, “On Estimating Post-Cold War Enemy Intention,” Intelligence and National Security 24:2 (2009): 
207. 
12
 Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 172. 
13
 “Rt. Hon. Jack Straw MP transcript,” The Iraq Inquiry, January 28, 2011, available at: 
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/51849/20110202-odonnell-final.pdf; Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 172. 
14
 “Sir David Omand transcript,” The Iraq Inquiry, January 20, 2010, available at: 
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/44187/20100120pm-omand-final.pdf. 
15
 Bruce Gregory, “Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported Norms,” 
(paper presented at the American Political Science Association Conference on International Communication and 
Conflict, Washington, D.C., August 31, 2005), 31. 
16
  “Security Intelligence Cycle,” Canadian Security Intelligence Service. 
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Sometimes intelligence is used as a legitimate call to rally the international community against a 
violation of international law. For example, in the 1980s the United States incorporated SPOT 
satellite images into a Department of Defense publication to support charges that the Soviet 
Union had violated the nuclear test-ban and had biological warfare capability.17 In addition, 
President Kennedy’s reliance on American intelligence gave him the confidence to both act on 
the Cuban Missile Crisis and accurately communicate the threat to audiences in the United States 
and abroad.18 In these cases, intelligence and public diplomacy operated harmoniously because 
the policymakers were fortunate enough for the intelligence to convey what the government 
wanted it to. The problem is that sometimes intelligence assessments contain nuances that the 
executive branch would prefer the public did not know. This issue is explored in the case studies 
below. 
 
Case Study #1: Using the Intelligence Community to Justify the 2003 Invasion of 
Iraq 
This section examines the British and American uses of intelligence to justify the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003. The aim of these efforts in public diplomacy was to influence American and British 
public opinion.19 In addition to being one the most contemporary examples of intelligence in 
public diplomacy, the government messages that preceded the invasion perhaps best exemplify 
the consequences of when the executive branch misrepresents intelligence to support its own 
objectives. The governments of the United States and the United Kingdom may have 
accomplished this objective prior to the invasion, but it was greatly overshadowed by the 
revelations that emerged afterwards. This case, like the second case study, has also been chosen 
because of each government’s heavy reliance on intelligence assessments to support their claims. 
 
American Public Diplomacy Leading up to the Invasion 
American attitudes leading up to the war in Iraq must be understood in the context of the 
country’s unprecedented sense of vulnerability in the wake of 9/11, and the growing demands for 
threat detection.20 Though the intelligence community was criticized afterwards, Len Scott 
contends that 9/11 actually strengthened the legitimacy of secret intelligence.21 Since then, “war 
on terrorism” has given intelligence a new level of importance in the execution of controversial 
foreign policy decisions—particularly military action.22 It is for this reason that “[c]entral to the 
George W. Bush administration’s strategy for building public support for the Iraq War was the 
public use of intelligence” (i.e. using intelligence for public diplomacy).23  
 
                                                          
17
 Peter. D. Zimmerman, “Remote sensing satellites, superpower relations and public diplomacy,” Space Policy 6:1 
(1990): 23. 
18
 Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 166. 
19
 John Prados and Christopher Ames (eds.), “THE IRAQ WAR - - PART III: Shaping the Debate,” The National 
Security Archive at The George Washington University, October 4, 2010, available at: 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB330/. 
20
 Len Scott and Peter Jackson, “The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice,” Intelligence and National 
Security 19 (2004), 139. 
21
 Len Scott, “Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Policy,” in Len V. Scott and Peter Jackson, 
Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century (London: Routledge, 2004), 175. 
22
 Scott and Jackson, “The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice,” 163. 
23
 Hastedt, “The Politics of Intelligence and the Politicization of Intelligence,” 26. 
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This strategy is best illustrated by Secretary of State Colin Powell’s address to the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) on February 5, 2003. Were it a speech in a closed door 
meeting, it would be nothing more than a private appeal to international governments. However, 
this speech was televised and broadcast throughout the United States, preceded and followed by 
media analysis.24 In that speech, Powell argued, among other things, that it had a “thick 
intelligence file…on Iraq’s biological weapons…[and] mobile production facilities used to make 
biological agents.”25  
 
In addition to relying on intelligence assessments, Powell used the intelligence community itself 
as a tool of legitimacy. It is no coincidence that the Director of Central Intelligence, George 
Tenet, sat alongside Powell as he argued before the UNSC that Iraq posed an existential threat to 
the world.26 Prefacing his allegations of Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
program and its ties to al-Qaeda, Powell underscored that “every statement I make today is 
backed up by sources, solid sources…These are not assertions…What we are giving you are 
facts and conclusions.”27 Recognizing the potential impact of the speech, polls were soon taken 
to estimate the impact on American public opinion. A Gallup poll revealed that 79 percent of 
Americans felt that Powell made either a “fairly strong” or “very strong” case for the invasion of 
Iraq.28 In the short-term, the strategy appeared to have worked. 
 
The same rhetoric was used by President Bush, who frequently referenced American intelligence 
while warning domestic audiences that Saddam Hussein was poised to use chemical weapons.29 
For example, in an address he gave in Cincinnati in October 2002, President Bush claimed that 
“[w]e’ve also discovered through intelligence that Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and 
unmanned aerial vehicles [UAVs] that could be used to disperse chemical and biological 
weapons across broad areas.”30 Like Powell’s statements, this argument relies on assessments 
from the intelligence community (or at least claims to). 
 
As we now know, many of these assertions were categorically false. What is most problematic is 
that much of this rhetoric appeared to go against intelligence that the Bush administration had in 
its possession. With the exception of a German-Iraqi source who later admitted that he lied, the 
Bush administration’s evidence claims were mostly rooted in the October 2002 National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE).31 It was not publicly released until July 18, 2003, four months after 
the invasion began. It began with the key judgment “that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass 
                                                          
24
 Douglas M. McLeod, “Derelict of Duty: The American News Media, Terrorism, and the War in Iraq,” Marquette 
Law Review 93:1 (2009): 119. 
25
 “Full Text of Colin Powell’s Speech,” The Guardian, February 5, 2003, available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa. 
26
 Ibid, 28. 
27
 Guardian, “Full Text of Colin Powell’s Speech” (February 5, 2003). 
28
 Gallup, George Horace and Jr Gallup Frank Newport, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 2003, in George Jr. Galup 
(ed.) The Gallups Poll Annual (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 51. 
29Hastedt, “The Politics of Intelligence and the Politicization of Intelligence,” 28. 
30
 “Transcript: George Bush’s speech on Iraq,” The Guardian, October 7, 2002, available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/oct/07/usa.iraq. 
31
 Martin Chulov and Helen Pidd, “Defector admits to WMD lies that triggered Iraq War,” The Guardian, February 
15, 2011, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa.  
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destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions.”32 On the contrary, 
the CIA later confirmed that Saddam Hussein had no active WMD program and no plans to 
revive it (though this may have changed if sanctions had been lifted).33 Worse yet, a report by the 
Senate’s Select Committee on Intelligence revealed in 2006 that, contrary to Powell’s 
announcement to the UNSC, the Iraqi regime “had no link to al-Qaeda.”34  
 
So catastrophic was the invalidation of the Bush administration’s justification for the war that in 
2008, the outgoing President Bush called the “intelligence failure” his “biggest regret of all the 
presidency.” At the same time, however, he seemed to absolve his administration of all 
responsibility, stating that he “wish[ed] the intelligence had been different.”35 There is 
formidable evidence that, contrary to this claim, the intelligence itself was not the main problem. 
Rather, the problem was the politicization of intelligence by his administration to make its 
arguments more persuasive to both the UNSC and the public at large. 
 
By having the ostensibly full support of intelligence officials like George Tenet, American 
politicians “conveniently blamed” the intelligence community after no WMD were found and 
shifted the burden from the executive branch to the public service.36 However, it has since been 
revealed that there was an abundance of caveats and nuances that the Bush administration kept 
hidden until after the invasion began (and even then they were not highlighted to the public). 
While the October 2002 NIE did open with the inaccurate statement about Iraq’s WMD program, 
it also admitted that it “lack[ed] specific information on many key aspects of Iraq’s WMD 
programs.” It added that there was no “compelling case” that Iraq was pursuing nuclear weapons. 
As if that were not enough, it included a “low confidence” assessment of when Saddam Hussein 
would use WMD, whether he would attack the United States Homeland, and whether he would 
cooperate with al-Qaeda.37 Professors Stephen Hartnett and Laura Stengrim would label these 
qualifying statements as “intelligence conditional.”38 The problem, as Hastedt explains, is that 
the Bush administration cherry picked the intelligence that it presented to the public.39  
 
Hastedt’s comment is only one example of the accusations mounted against the Bush 
administration for the wilful ignorance of the information available, as well as the occasional 
complete fabrication of intelligence. Hartnett and Stengrim point out that when Bush’s rhetoric 
surrounding Iraq’s WMD program began to become scrutinized by the media, White House 
Press Secretary, Scott McLlellan, simply replied that the President was “not a fact checker.” The 
President, his Secretary of State, and various military officials all supported their assertions with 
                                                          
32
 “Key Judgements [from October 2002 NIE: Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction],” 
Federation of American Scientists, July 18, 2003, available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-wmd.html. 
33
 Central Intelligence Agency, “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD,” 
CIA.gov, September 30, 2004, available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-
1/iraq_wmd_2004/Comp_Report_Key_Findings.pdf. 
34
 “Saddam ‘had no link to al-Qaeda’,” BBC, September 9, 2006, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5328592.stm.  
35
 Suzanne Goldenberg, “Iraq war my biggest regret, Bush admits,” The Guardian, December 2, 2008, available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/dec/02/george-bush-iraq-interview.  
36
 Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 125. 
37
 “Key Judgements,” Federation of American Scientists. 
38
 Stephen Hartnett and Laura Stengrim, “The Whole Operation of Deception: Reconstructing President Bush’s 
Rhetoric of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies 4:2 (2004): 157. 
39
 Hastedt, “The Politics of Intelligence and the Politicization of Intelligence,” 26. 
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intelligence assessments that turned out not to exist. Nevertheless, guilt was still offloaded to the 
intelligence agencies when the falsities of their rhetoric came to light.40  
 
In fairness, the intelligence community had its own problems as well. The 2004 report by the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence revealed that many of the doubts within the intelligence 
community about Iraq’s connections with al-Qaeda (an important counter-argument to the Bush 
administration’s justification for the war) were removed from the analysis within the intelligence 
community before it was disseminated to decision-makers.41 Even after this report, Director of 
Central Intelligence, Porter Goss, continued to encourage members of the CIA to tailor their 
assessments to support United States policymakers. In his criticism of this action, Jervis 
concedes that if Goss had only been encouraging the CIA to “inform policymakers” and “support 
better policy” it would have been sound practice. However, as Jervis notes, given the previous 
accusations that the CIA had “undercut” President Bush, it is more likely that it was an 
instruction to “reinforc[e] policies and rall[y] others to the cause.”42  
 
In any case, one should not consider intelligence officers as completely apolitical and 
independent decision-makers, since they have political biases and ideological assumptions.43 
Thomas Fingar observes that analysts are not completely isolated from federal politics in the 
United States.44 Even if analysts were unbiased, Fingar believes that the intelligence community 
was “too timid when assessing possibilities…and insufficiently aggressive when presenting 
worst-case scenarios.” He suggests that this may not have been an overt distortion to pander to 
politicians, but an inadvertent tendency to frame things in such a way that may have made it 
easier for politicians to misuse their assessments for political purposes.45  
 
This tendency does not mean, however, that politicians have no choice in the matter. It should 
not be discounted that American politicians’ created a “war fervor” that changed the atmosphere 
in the intelligence community in the first place.46 Jervis argues that even had the intelligence 
analysis been better, policymakers would have “still been able to exaggerate the intelligence to 
justify the war.”47 As an example, most senior figures in the administration suggested that there 
was a connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda, and characterized the threat of WMD as 
“imminent.” All of these claims were contrary to the consensus of the intelligence community.48 
These misrepresentations were made possible by the government’s decision to withhold the 
original intelligence assessments from the public before the war began. 
 
                                                          
40
 Hartnett and Stengrim, “The Whole Operation of Deception,” 164-169. 
41
 “Report on the US Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq,” Senate Committee on 
Intelligence, United States Senate, 108th Cong., 2d sess., July 7, 2004, available at: 
http://web.mit.edu/simsong/www/iraqreport2-textunder.pdf. 
42
 Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 159. 
43
 Scott and Jackson, “The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice,” 152. 
44
 Thomas Fingar, Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security (Stanford: Stanford Security 
Studies, 2011), 97. 
45
 Ibid, 94-95. 
46
 Ibid, 93.  
47
 Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 154. 
48
 Ibid, 132. 
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The distortion of intelligence from the analysis stage to the public diplomacy stage is best 
illustrated by the Bush administration’s public allegation that Iraq was seeking uranium from 
Niger, which was later proven to be false. Although this allegation was reported by British 
intelligence officials, it was well known by the Bush administration that American intelligence 
analysts disagreed with this.49 Most tellingly, it was later revealed that the decision to include 
this intelligence came from none other than a speech writer. Without changing the content, the 
White House modified the language just enough that if the allegations were proven to be false, it 
could blame the CIA (which it did).50  
 
Nevertheless, the reputations of both the executive branch and the intelligence community 
suffered from the revelations that followed the Iraq invasion. According to Gallup polls, about 
half of the American public blamed the Bush administration (despite its attempts to offload 
blame to the intelligence community) and a little more than half expressed low or zero 
confidence in the American intelligence community afterwards.51 Evidently, the image of both 
the executive branch and the intelligence community had been tarnished in the United States. 
Public trust would now be more difficult to obtain. 
 
British Public Diplomacy Leading up to the Invasion 
The United Kingdom’s use of intelligence leading up to the Iraq War suffered from similar 
problems. With the exception of the Bush administration’s allegation of an Iraq-al-Qaeda 
connection, the United Kingdom’s public allegations against Iraq were roughly a mirror image of 
those made by their American counterparts. By April 2002, British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, 
publicly announced that Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of mass destruction and was 
a threat to the region and to the West. In September, he claimed that the intelligence service 
“conclude[d] that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons” and that Saddam Hussein had 
“active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons.”52 This claim was 
repeated several months later, and Prime Minister Blair held steadfast to his assertions until over 
a year into the invasion.53 In addition, the United Kingdom’s now infamous “September Dossier” 
publicly asserted that Iraq was on a trajectory to developing nuclear weapons “within months,” 
and had active plans to make use of weapons of mass destruction.54 The dossier has since been 
accused of being sloppily assembled and plagiarizing from essays dating back to 1997.55 
Significantly, all of it claimed to be supported by intelligence compiled by the joint intelligence 
community (JIC).56 Like in the United States, “[British] intelligence [was] the fundamental basis 
for the case [the British government] made” for the invasion of Iraq.57 
 
                                                          
49
 Ibid. 
50
 Hartnett and Stengrim, “The Whole Operation of Deception,” 174-177. 
51
 Gallup, Alec and Frank Newport, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 2005 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2006), 149. 
52
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Years later, testimony from the Iraq Inquiry suggested that the Blair administration had 
intentionally departed from the information given to them by the intelligence community for its 
public diplomacy. Carne Ross, a former civil servant for the British Foreign Office, told the 
inquiry that ministers intentionally exaggerated intelligence assessments of WMD in their efforts 
at public diplomacy.58 Further, briefing papers had been “more definitive” than the intelligence 
had suggested.59 Therefore, like the Bush administration’s rhetoric, the British allegations were 
not necessarily fabricated, but modified to fit the policymakers’ public diplomacy strategy. 
David Omand, another former British civil servant, testified that intelligence officials were 
satisfied about the generalized statements that were made—it was the details that concerned 
them.60  
 
Like its American counterpart, the British intelligence community was also at fault. The now 
declassified JIC assessment of September 2002 began with three key judgments that could have 
easily been used to make the exaggerated claims made by the British government. The JIC 
regularly presented these assessments to the Prime Minister, the senior ministers, and other 
officials who dealt with policymaking.61 Unlike previous assessments, the conclusions in this 
document offered few caveats. It began with the assertion that Iraq “has a chemical and 
biological weapons capability and Saddam is prepared to use it.”62 It was from statements like 
these that Prime Minister Blair later excused his administration by “mak[ing] the point that the 
assumptions in all of [the JIC assessments] was [sic] that Saddam was committed in both the 
intent and the action in developing WMD.”63 However, like President Bush’s attempt at self-
exculpation, it failed. An empirical study published in 2012 suggested that there was “strong 
prima facie evidence” that the war and the government’s use of intelligence had a significant 
negative impact on public confidence in both the intelligence community and the government’s 
presentation of intelligence.64 The authors of the study concluded that this confidence level may 
negatively affect the public’s willingness to support any preventive military action in the 
future.65 
 
In recognition of this danger, the Iraq Inquiry noted that future intelligence assessments will need 
to be carefully worded with as many caveats as possible.66 However, these efforts may not be 
enough. As Jervis observed, even had the intelligence been better, politicians could have still 
ignored caveats and exaggerated claims to increase public support for the war.67 One way of 
avoiding this would be to submit the full intelligence assessment to government ministers, rather 
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than submitting something that was for a “marketing purpose.” This could reduce the danger of 
losing caveats when the information is presented to the public.68 Failing that, the obvious 
alternative would be to disclose the intelligence assessments directly to the public, as was done 
after the 2013 chemical attack in Syria. 
 
Case Study #2: Public Diplomacy after the 2013 Syrian Chemical Attack 
The British and American intelligence communities’ willingness to reform was tested after the 
2013 Syrian chemical attack, when Western countries once again publicly presented intelligence 
in an attempt to persuade the public that a military strike on Syria was in order. This section 
examines the United States’ and the United Kingdom’s response, comparing their use of 
intelligence for public diplomacy to what was used prior to the invasion of Iraq. It appears that 
while the United Kingdom has become more willing to share original intelligence assessments, 
the United States continues to limit its disclosure to the executive branch’s own interpretation of 
the intelligence. 
 
The Attack 
On August 21, 2013, the rebel-held Eastern Ghouta neighbourhood just outside of Damascus was 
shelled by surface-to-surface rockets, which the UN later concluded contained sarin gas. The 
casualties included civilians, with children among them.69 A debate immediately began as to 
what the international response should be. 
 
The United States’ Response 
Having previously marked the use of chemical weapons as a “red line”, President Obama’s 
administration reacted to the event with a sense of obligation.70 Initial intelligence assessments 
appeared to stress that there was no conclusive proof of what exactly happened, but within a 
week of the attack, the Obama administration felt comfortable establishing a timeline.71 The 
government’s public assessment expressed a “high degree of confidence” that the Syrian 
government had carried out the attack. It claimed that the information had been corroborated by 
satellites, discussed the symptoms of the victims, and gave a casualty estimate. It also mentioned, 
however, that additional intelligence would need to remain classified.72 At no point did the 
Obama administration address the fact that the German BND had publicly asserted that Assad 
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did not personally order the attack (based on its own signals intelligence).73 “Intelligence 
conditional” appeared to be absent once again. 
 
Public statements made on the attack also have parallels to the Iraq case. In a similar fashion to 
Powell’s 2003 speech to the UNSC, the intelligence summary was cited by Secretary of State 
John Kerry in a televised briefing the same month, who argued that a military response was 
justified.74 As well, United States Senator Bob Casey emerged from an intelligence briefing 
announcing that he now had evidence “of the national security imperative in Syria and the need 
to authorize the limited use of force.”75 
 
At the same time, there were marked differences between the Obama administration’s approach 
to Syria and the Bush administration’s approach leading up to the Iraq invasion. For one thing, it 
should be noted that earlier reports on the use of chlorine gas in Syria were actually played down 
by the Obama administration, rather than using it as evidence to support an attack.76 Clearly 
recognizing the parallel with Iraq, President Obama made it clear to the public that only “rock 
solid” intelligence would justify American intervention in the conflict.77  
 
Paradoxically, United States officials made numerous claims about the 2013 gas attack without 
invoking the support of the intelligence community at all. For instance, Jay Carney concluded 
that the details of the event were simply “abundantly obvious.”78 Susan Rice, a key figure in the 
United States’ public diplomacy strategy, seemed uninterested in what the intelligence had to 
say. She assumed that it could not tell her anything that she did not already know.79 This may 
explain why rather than releasing an NIE, a document that would have been drafted by the 
intelligence community, the White House chose to release a statement themselves. This was 
done despite the fact that members of Congress have requested a record number of NIEs in the 
last few years.80  
 
In the end, the Obama administration’s strategy was poorly received. Polls taken after the 
government’s assessment was released reflected strong opposition to the proposed strike. 
                                                          
73
 Simon Tisdall and Josie Le Blond, “Assad did not order Syria chemical weapons attack, says German press,” The 
Guardian, September 9, 2013, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/08/syria-chemical-
weapons-not-assad-bild. 
74
 Scott Sayare, “French Release Intelligence Tying Assad Government to Chemical Weapons,” The New York 
Times, September 3, 2013, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/03/world/middleeast/french-release-
intelligence-tying-assad-government-to-chemical-weapons.html?_r=0. 
75
 Robert P. Casey, Jr., “Casey Statement following Intelligence Briefing from the Administration on Syria,” Robert 
P. Casey, Jr.: United States Senator for Pennsylvania, September 3, 2013, available at 
http://www.casey.senate.gov/newsroom/releases/casey-statement-following-intelligence-briefing-from-the-
administration-on-syria.  
76
 “Officials: Preliminary results show chemical weapons not used in Syria,” CNN Wire, March 21, 2013, available 
at: http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/21/world/meast/syria-civil-war/?hpt=hp_t1. 
77
 James Blitz and Geoff Dyer, “Strategy towards Syria haunted by flawed intelligence on Iraq’s weapons,” The 
Financial Times, April 27, 2013, p. 3. 
78
 “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney,” The White House, August 27, 2013, available at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/27/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-8272013. 
79
 Adam Entous, Sam Dagher, and Siobhan Gorman, “US, Allies Prepare to Act as Syria Intelligence Mounts,” The 
Wall Street Journal, August 27, 2013, available at: 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324906304579039342815115978. 
80
 Fingar, Reducing Uncertainty, 90. 
Pinkus: Intelligence and Public Diplomacy
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013
 44 
 
Political analysts found the assessment disingenuous and unconvincing.81 One could argue that 
there is hypocrisy in insisting on “rock solid” intelligence for action and then demanding action 
without proving any of the intelligence itself. The public’s reaction to the government’s 
interpretation of the intelligence should be unsurprising, given that the problems from the Iraq 
War emerged from the suppression and distortion of important caveats in the intelligence.  
 
The United Kingdom’s Response 
In contrast, the United Kingdom decided to change its approach and share more intelligence 
directly with the public. The British administration did not rely on a government dossier as it did 
before the Iraq War. Despite having renounced the practice of publicly releasing intelligence 
papers several years earlier, the British executive branch made the rare move of releasing the full 
JIC assessment of the attack. This was done in the aim of influencing both politicians and the 
broader public to support military action.82 While its reliance on intelligence differed from the 
Americans, the JIC’s statement came to roughly the same conclusions. It stressed that the 
decision was made “with the highest possible level of certainty.” Reminding the public that it 
had access to highly sensitive intelligence, it claimed that it had high confidence in everything—
a except for the regime’s motivation.83 Perhaps recalling the dire consequences of underplaying 
important caveats leading up to the Iraq War, the JIC placed its hesitations front and center.  
 
In spite of this decision, it is clear that the public was unimpressed by the JIC’s statement. The 
Guardian criticized the report almost immediately, accusing it of having a “striking lack of 
scientific evidence” that “adds nothing to informed speculation.” It quoted chemical weapons 
experts who cited the lack of “hard facts”, and even cast doubts on whether chemical weapons 
were used at all. Ironically, however, the newspaper most criticized the JIC for its inclusion of 
caveats regarding the Syrian government’s motivation, suggesting that this invalidated the rest of 
the intelligence that was given.84 In the end, the government’s proposal to pursue action in Syria 
was rejected by British Parliament.85 
 
The public’s reaction and the political result may have left the British government disappointed, 
but it arguably left them which much more credibility. It is less likely than it was in the case of 
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Iraq that the government would be accused of misrepresenting intelligence to mislead the public. 
It allowed members of the public to form an informed opinion based on all the facts that were 
available and avoid taking military action for faulty reasons. This could lay groundwork for a 
more trusting British public the next time it is faced with the prospect of preventive military 
action. 
 
Possibilities for the Future 
Regardless of the reforms implemented to the use of intelligence for public diplomacy, this 
strategy will inevitably continue in the future. Though illustrative of some of the changes in 
practice since Iraq, it would be imprudent to assume that the Syrian example categorically 
reflects how governments will present intelligence in the future. In response to the contentious 
Iranian nuclear issue, the White House has declassified as much intelligence as possible. Fingar 
believes that the United States government now releases this information ahead of time to make 
sure that it has the power to contextualize the intelligence before someone else does it first.86 
This danger is reflected in the recent WikiLeaks scandal. In that case, a third party obtained 
sensitive American intelligence and released it to the public against the government’s wishes. 
One of these leaks revealed North Korea’s sale of nineteen missiles to Iran. Since the raw 
intelligence was released by WikiLeaks, the media speculated on the implications of this 
intelligence and contextualized it themselves, rather than waiting for the government to explain 
it.87  
 
The concern about who gets to interpret intelligence may also reflect a broader change in the 
dissemination of intelligence to the public. Richard Aldrich and John Kasuku predict that 
“intelligence in the Twitter age will not be owned by government.”88 Because the form of 
communicating intelligence to the public is so important, this may change the way that 
intelligence is used for public diplomacy. In the past, Americans could be swayed by government 
communications conveyed through mainstream media, where they were almost assured front 
page coverage.89 Now, however, thanks to the ubiquity of online news, blogs, and social media, 
it may help spread doubt even when the government expresses a high degree of confidence, as 
was the case in Syria. This may accelerate the British executive branch’s attempts to use 
intelligence more transparently and force its American counterpart to follow suit. While a certain 
amount of information may always need to be withheld for security reasons, the Syrian case 
study above demonstrates that greater transparency is possible. 
 
Conclusion 
In the past, governments may have believed that it was in their interest to present only the 
intelligence that supported their policy objectives and pay less attention to the caveats contained 
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in intelligence assessments. However, the United Kingdom’s implementation of some of the 
lessons learned from the Iraq Inquiry suggests that governments may be willing to change. In 
order to regain the public’s trust, both the United States and the United Kingdom will need to 
present intelligence in a more transparent fashion when it is used for public diplomacy. 
 
Reports and polls by the media suggest that the strategy of using intelligence in public diplomacy 
has been tarnished. Ultimately, it seems unavoidable that the intelligence will be politicized to a 
certain degree in order to support policy objectives. However, governments may be able to 
increase public confidence in the use of intelligence for public diplomacy if its executive 
branches are willing to share intelligence assessments more transparently, including those 
aspects which shed the course of action they are advocating for in an unfavourable light.  
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